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An Analysis of the United States 
Employment Immigration System in 
Attracting and Retaining Skilled Workers 
and the Effects of Its Dichotomous 
Objectives—Competitiveness versus 
Protectionism: A Case for Reform? 
 
Vignaswari Saminathan* 
 
“[F]rom this day forth, those wishing to emigrate into America shall be 
admitted on the basis of their skills.”1 
 
 —Lyndon Johnson 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The statement made by President Lyndon Johnson upon signing the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) describes today’s 
 
       *  The Author holds LL.B (University of Sheffield, U.K.), LL.M in International 
Business Law (University College London, U.K.), LL.M in International Law (University 
of Houston, Texas, U.S.) and MBA (Oklahoma City University, U.S.) as well as being 
admitted as a Barrister-at-Law to the Utter Bar of the Honorable Society of Middle 
Temple (U.K.) and an Advocate & Solicitor of the Malayan High Court. The Author’s 
practice areas had included corporate banking, finance, and capital markets, and currently 
her focus is on multilateral and regional efforts pertaining to financial and trade 
arrangements, with a special interest on the impact of immigration on regional and global 
level. She would like to take this opportunity to extend her heartfelt gratitude to Lisa 
Tilton-McCarty, Professor of Legal Research and Writing at University of Houston Law 
Center as well as the dedicated Pace Law Review team for their outstanding efforts in 
editing and making possible the publication of this Article. 
1. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: 
PROCESS AND POLICY 162 (5th ed. 2003); Ayelet Shachar, The Race For Talent: Highly 
Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration Regimes, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148, 170 
(2006). 
1
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immigration system for the admission of immigrants of skill. Nowadays 
these immigrants are identified as the “best and brightest.”2 The best and 
brightest receive preferential treatment because of the significant 
contributions these immigrants make to the U.S. economy.
3
 
Other governments of the world share the goal of attracting and 
retaining the best and brightest: 
 
Governments throughout the world recognize that a 
high-skill [Science & Engineering] workforce is 
essential for economic strength. Countries beyond the 
United States have been taking action to increase the 
capacity of their higher education systems, attract 
foreign students and workers, and raise the attractiveness 
to their own citizenry of staying home or returning from 
abroad to serve growing national economics and 
research enterprises.
4
 
 
As a result, immigration has taken on a new dimension because 
highly skilled immigrants now have many choices about where to 
immigrate.
5
 Given this development, can the U.S. immigration system 
maintain its competitiveness? 
Over the years, two divergent objectives have emerged within the 
U.S. system: protectionist measures to safeguard or protect the interests 
of U.S. workers, and competitive measures to attract and retain the best 
and brightest immigrants. When in balance, these dichotomous 
objectives should promote adequate protection of U.S. workers and the 
global competitiveness necessary to attract talented immigrants to 
enhance the U.S. economy. However, the high demand for skilled 
international workers by domestic U.S. industries during the economic 
boom of the 1990s (as well as the period of 2004-2007) stretched the 
 
2. Shachar, supra note 1. 
3. See Ajay Malshe, From Obsolete to Essential: How Reforming Our Immigration 
Laws Can Stimulate and Strengthen the United States Economy, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 
358 (2010); see also Courtney L. Cromwell, Note, Friend or Foe of the U.S. Labor 
Market: Why Congress Should Raise or Eliminate the H-1B Visa Cap., 3 BROOK. J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM. L. 455 (2009). 
4. Shachar, supra note 1, at 195 (quoting NAT’L SCI. BD., THE SCIENCE AND 
ENGINEERING WORKFORCE: REALIZING AMERICA’S POTENTIAL 11 (2003), available 
athttp://www.nsf.gov/nsb/documents/2003/nsb0369/nsb0369.pdf). 
5. Shachar, supra note 1, at 152. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/4
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capacity of the immigration system because of quantitative constraints 
imposed on immigration to protect the interests of U.S. workers.
6
 As a 
result, instead of being able to offer the best and brightest immediate 
legal permanent residency, as is being done within competitor nations, 
the U.S. can now, at best, only offer a long wait for legal permanent 
residency, and at the worst, offer an uncertain future as to whether the 
application for permanent residency will be decided in favor of the 
would-be immigrant.
7
 Thus, instead of being admitted on the basis of 
skill, as envisaged by President Johnson, the best and brightest, for most 
of their productive years, are admitted into the U.S. on a temporary 
nonimmigrant visa.
8
 
The aim of this Article is to analyze the dichotomous objectives of 
U.S. immigration policy and to determine what recourse exists to 
improve the competitiveness of the U.S. immigration system and to 
ensure adequate protection for U.S. workers. Given that the H-1B visa, 
the temporary nonimmigrant visa category, has become a very important 
stepping stone to legal permanent residency, this Article will examine the 
developments and impact of the dichotomous measures within the 
context of the H-1B as well as the second employment-based preference 
category (EB-2) and the third employment-based preference category 
(EB-3).
9
 As such, Part II of this Article will trace the development of 
measures encapsulating these dichotomous objectives. Part III will 
analyze the effect quantitative restraints have had on the immigration of 
the best and brightest. The Article then, in Part IV, will examine the 
impact of the dichotomous objectives on four levels: the global labor 
market, the needs of the U.S. domestic market; protections of U.S. 
workers; and interests of the international workers. In Part V, the focus 
will be on finding solutions and making recommendations that go toward 
realigning these dichotomous objectives to ensure that the needs at all 
four levels are met. 
 
6. See Cromwell, supra note 3, at 455-58. 
7. See NAT’L FOUND. FOR AM. POLICY, EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARD 
PROJECTIONS POINT TO DECADE-LONG WAITS (2009), available at 
http://www.nfap.com/pdf/091117pb.pdf [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARD]. 
8. See Moira Herbst, One Easy Fix for Immigration, BUS. WEEK (June 21, 2007), 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jun2007/db20070620_915353.ht
m; see also Vivek Wadhwa, America’s Other Immigration Crisis, AMERICAN (July/Aug. 
2008), http://www.american.com/archive/2008/july-august-magazine-
contents/america2019s-other-immigration-crisis. 
9. See Malshe, supra note 3; see also Cromwell, supra note 3. 
3
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II. Tracing the Dichotomy in the History of U.S. Immigration Laws 
 
This Part will examine the dichotomy between competitiveness and 
protectionism throughout the history of U.S. immigration policy as it 
relates to employment concerns. 
 
A.  The Early Years 
 
During its first one hundred years, the U.S. offered an open door 
policy to immigrants.
10
 There were no impediments in regards to quotas 
based on origin of nationality nor was there a cap on the number of aliens 
admitted to the U.S. It was not until 1875 that the first immigration 
restrictions began to appear.
11
 In 1885, the first employment-based 
immigration restriction was imposed by the Alien Contract Labor Laws 
(ACLL), which barred cheap foreign workers in an attempt to safeguard 
domestic workers against labor market depression.
12
 An 1888 
amendment to the ACLL required deportation of those persons entering 
the country in violation of the ACLL.
13
 In 1921, the first quota system 
was put in place, not to address immigrant employment issues, but 
instead in response to fears of a mass influx of immigrants from Southern 
and Eastern Europe after the First World War.
14
 This system established 
an annual national origin quota of 3 percent for each nationality already 
in the U.S.
15
 
 
B. The McCarran Walter Act of 1952 and the 1965 Amendment 
 
The present structure of the immigration system was established by 
 
10. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 1, at 148-51. 
11. See IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 3 (12th. ed. 2011) (The 
Act of March 3, 1875 required “the exclusion of convicts and prostitutes.”). 
12. See FRAGOMAN ET AL., H-1B HANDBOOK §1:2 (2011 ed.). The anti-contract 
labor law was incorporated into the Immigration Act of 1917. The aim of the law was to 
prevent U.S. employers from employing cheap foreign labor to break strikes as well as to 
safeguard against the depression of wages and working conditions in the U.S. Id. 
13. KURZBAN, supra note 11. The 1888 amendment was the first statute to impose a 
one-year bar on re-entry by the deported aliens. Id. 
14. Id. at 4. The quota imposed by the 1921 Act, after gradual reductions, was 
eventually repealed by the 1965 amendment. Id. 
15. Id. The 3 percent was based on the 1910 census. Id. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/4
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the McCarran Walter Act (INA), which was the product of a two-year 
study conducted by the Senate Judiciary Committee.
16
 Recognizing the 
value of attracting talented immigrant and nonimmigrant workers, the 
Senate recommended the abolishment of the contract labor bar
17
 and, 
more importantly, established preferences within the quotas for aliens 
with special skills.
18
 This was the precursor to today’s first, second, and 
third employment-based preferences.
19
 The INA also established a 
temporary nonimmigrant visa category, known as H-1, for 
nonimmigrants who had “distinguished merit and ability.”20 The 
competitiveness of the immigration system, however, was tempered by 
pressures from labor unions.
21
 This pressure culminated in the 
establishment of a labor certification requirement in 1965, as a 
mechanism to protect U.S. workers from cheap foreign labor.
22
 
 
C. Immigration Act of 1990 
 
The impetus behind the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990 
(IMMACT90) was increasing global competition for the best and 
brightest immigrants, which was driven by the burgeoning high-
technology industry of the 1980s.
23
 The increasing competition led “to 
 
16. Id. The McCarran Walter Act was “codified at Title 8 of the U.S. Code.” Id. 
17. See FRAGOMEN ET AL., supra note 12, § 1.3 (explaining the contract labor bar). 
18. KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 4. 
19. FRAGOMEN ET AL., supra note 12, § 1.3 
20. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
21. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 1, at 333. 
22. Id. In Pesikoff v. Sec’y of Labor, 501 F.2d. 757, 761-63 (D.C. Cir. 1974), 
reference was made to Senator Kennedy’s statement as to who bears the burden of proof 
under the new labor certifications requirement. His statement is indicative of the intent of 
the new requirement: 
 
Under (the old) procedure, the Secretary certifies that aliens falling 
under certain occupational or skill definitions should be excluded 
because they will threaten domestic employment. The [1965 
amendment] reverses this procedure. It places the burden of proving 
no adverse effect on the applying alien. This intending immigrant 
must receive a certificate from the Secretary of Labor that his 
presence will not affect U.S employment, wages, or working 
conditions. 
 
Id. at 761-62. 
23. See Jung S. Hahm, Note, American Competitiveness and Workforce 
5
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fears concerning the U.S. work force’s ability to compete in the global 
economy.”24 In 1967, Canada introduced a point-based system that 
essentially allowed for the use of an objective tool in evaluating and 
selecting foreign nationals with high levels of skill sets or abilities.
25
 The 
point-based system proved to be successful.
26
 As a result, Australia, in 
1973, and, subsequently, New Zealand adopted similar targeting and 
selecting methodology to recruit talented foreign nationals.
27
 
The IMMACT90 was essentially a “compromise between . . . the 
[INS], labor unions, the immigration bar, and an assemblage of different 
groups with varying philosophies.”28 On one hand it addressed the need 
to be competitive while on the other hand it ensured that U.S. workers 
were protected.
29
 In doing so, it also substantially expanded the 
employment-based immigration system.
30
 In the process, it created the 
five employment-based preferences
31
 for permanent immigration and 
restructured the nonimmigrant H-1 category.
32
 One of the offshoots of 
that restructuring was the H-1B visa.
33
 
Of the five employment-based preference categories,
34
 the two that 
 
Improvement Act of 1998: Balancing Economic and Labor Interests Under the New H-1B 
Visa Program, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1673 (2000). 
24. Shachar, supra note 1, at 183 (quoting DAVID WEISSBRODT, IMMIGRATION LAW 
AND PROCEDURE 34 (3d ed. 1992)). 
25. Id. at 171. 
26. Id. at 176. 
27. Id. at 176-83. 
28. Hahm, supra note 23, at 1682 (alteration in original) (quoting Steven J. 
Klearman, Nonimmigrant Business Visas After the Immigration Act of 1990, 28 GONZ. L. 
REV. 53-54 (1992)); see also Klearman, supra, at 54. 
29. Hahm, supra note 23, at 1679-82. 
30. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 1, at 167. 
31. The preference system was chosen over the point-based system by the Senate 
Committee. The Preference System: Hearing on S. 1663 Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration and Refugee Policy of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 19-20 
(1981) (statement of Sen. Alan K. Simpson) [hereinafter The Preference System]. 
32. See KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 6; see also FRAGOMAN ET AL., supra note 12. 
The H-1 category is for nonimmigrants who are of “distinguished merit and ability.” Id. 
(internal quotations omitted). 
33. See FRAGOMAN ET AL., supra note 12, § 1:8. The IMMACT90 excludes from the 
H-1B category alien entertainers, artist, and athletes, who now must obtain a 
nonimmigrant visa only through the O and P nonimmigrant categories. Id. 
34. See MARTIN J. LAWLER, PROFESSIONALS: A MATTER OF DEGREE 4 (5th ed. 2009). 
The first employment-based preference relates to priority workers who may be 
individuals of “extraordinary ability,” outstanding “professors and researchers,” or 
“executives and managers of international organizations.” Id. The second preference 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/4
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are relevant to this Article are the second preference (EB-2) category for 
professional immigrants with advanced degrees and the third preference 
(EB-3) for those immigrants who are professionals and skilled workers.
35
 
Professionals must have at least a bachelor’s degree and “skilled workers 
must have at least two years of training and fill a position that is 
permanent.”36 
Having decided on the preference issue, Congress created an annual 
worldwide cap of 140,000 for the preference categories.
37
 This number 
was further constrained by the limitation that a single country could not 
exceed more than 7 percent
38
 of the total immigration visas available in a 
particular fiscal year, amounting to 9,800 of the 140,000 annually 
available visas.
39
 
To ensure that U.S. workers would not be displaced by immigrants 
in the U.S. labor market, IMMACT90 requires employers to test the 
market through a comprehensive labor certification process, such as 
advertisement and recruitment policies that ensure that “there are not 
sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified . . . and available,” in 
addition to the requirement that wages and working conditions of U.S. 
workers employed in similar position will not be adversely affected.
40
 
In order to stay competitive in the global race to attract the best and 
brightest as well as to meet the demands of the labor shortage in the U.S., 
the nonimmigrant H-1B category opened only for foreign nationals 
working in “specialty occupations” which require specific professional 
training or a showing by the applicant of prominence in their field.
41
 
 
relates to persons with advanced degrees and exceptional ability, whose work is in the 
national interest to retain through permanent residence. Id. The third preference includes 
skilled workers, professionals, and other workers, while the fourth preference relates to 
religious workers, and the fifth preference relates to investment in new businesses that 
generate U.S. jobs. Id. 
35. See Janice D Villiers, Closing the Borders: Reverse Brain Drain and the Need 
for Immigration Reform, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1877, 1887 (2009). 
36. Id. at 1888. 
37. LAWLER, supra note 34. 
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(d) (2009). 
39. Id. § 1152(a). 
40. Enid Trucios-Haynes, Temporary Workers and Future Immigration Policy 
Conflicts: Protecting U.S. Workers and Satisfying the Demand for Global Human 
Capital, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 967, 968 (2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(i) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
41. Malshe, supra note 3, at 363 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7
SAMINATHAN_Formatted_Finalv8 4/11/2012  7:34 PM 
156 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32:1 
IMMACT90 established dual intent for the H-1B visa
42
 and also allowed 
for an extension of the time period for temporary residents who had a 
pending application for permanent residency.
43
 
Nevertheless, two important restrictions were imposed on the H-1B 
visa: an annual cap of 65,000
44
 and a labor condition application 
(LCA).
45
 The purpose of enacting the LCA was to protect the U.S. 
workers from “wage suppression and substandard working conditions 
due to competition from imported foreign labor.”46 As a result, 
employers are required to attest that the H-1B hire will be paid the 
prevailing wage or actual wage and that the working condition for that 
hire is on par with a similar U.S. worker.
47
 By imposing these 
requirements, the LCA ensures that the H-1B worker will also be 
protected. However, the LCA is not required for those H-1B hires with 
master’s degree, or those who are earning in excess of $60,000.48 This is 
in line with the traditional use of the H-1 category for attracting the best 
and brightest.
49
 
 
D. The American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 
1998; Congressional Amendment of the H-1B Visa Program 
 
The American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 
1998 (ACWIA) was the result of a lobbying effort by the high-tech 
industry to increase the H-1B annual cap to address the shortage of 
 
42. See Cromwell, supra note 3, at 459-60. Dual intent “allows workers in the 
United States on nonimmigrant visas, such as the H-1B, to apply for permanent resident 
status while in the United States.” Id. at 479 (Norma Matloff, On the Need for Reform of 
the H-1B Non-Immigrant Work Visa in Computer-Related Occupations, 36 U. MICH. L.J. 
REFORM 815, 815 (2003)). 
43. KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 7. 
44. “[A] number that apparently was ‘randomly chosen without regard to American 
businesses’ need for or actual use of these visas.’” Hahm, supra note 23, at 1679 (quoting 
Gabrielle M. Buckley, Immigration and Nationality, 32 INT’L LAW. 471, 484 (1998)). 
45. FRAGOMAN ET AL., supra note 12, § 2:1; id. “The requirement was extensively 
amended by the Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Nationality Amendments 
of 1991 (MTINA) and most recently in 1998 by the American Competitiveness and 
Workforce Improvement Act (ACWIA).” FRAGOMAN ET AL., supra note 12, § 2:1 
46. Malshe, supra note 3, at 364. 
47. See FRAGOMAN ET AL., supra note 12, § 2:1. 
48. See id. § 1:10. 
49. See id. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/4
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skilled workers in an industry that was booming.
50
 As with IMMACT90, 
a compromise was reached with the various interest groups and the 
annual cap was raised to 115,000 in 1999 and 2000, then lowered to 
107,500 in 2001.
51
 The annual cap then reverted to 65,000 in 2002.
52
 As 
to the other side of the equation, ACWIA required stricter labor 
protections for U.S. workers as well as the H-1B workers employed by 
H-1B dependent employers,
53
 and these protections were to subsist until 
2002.
54
 An added requirement was that the H-1B worker was eligible for 
the same benefits offered to a U.S. worker.
55
 
Recognizing the need to address the labor shortage in the long run, 
the ACWIA increased the fees to be paid by employers hiring H-1B 
workers by $500.
56
 It was estimated that $75 million could be raised to 
fund scholarship for low-income students in math, science, engineering, 
and computer science, as well as training for thousands of Americans via 
the Job Training Partnership Act.
57
 
 
 
 
 
 
50. See Hahm, supra note 23, at 1674-75. 
51. See id. at 1676. 
52. Id. 
53. See Cromwell, supra note 3, at 460-61. H1-B dependent employers, created by 
the ACWIA, are those employers that hire workforces that have at least 15 percent H-1B 
workers. Id. at 460. 
54. See Hahm, supra note 23, at 1687. 
 
[A]n H-1B dependent employer must attest that (1) “it has not 
displaced and will not displace a U.S. worker for period of 180 days, 
beginning 90 days before the filing of the H-1B petition and ending 
90 days after the filing of the H-1B petition;” (2) that “it will not 
place the H-1B worker with another employer . . . where there are 
‘indicia of an employment relationship’ between the H-1B worker 
and the second employer unless it first asks the other employer 
whether it has or intends to displace a U.S. worker within 180-day 
period; . . . .” 
 
Id. (quoting J. Traci Hong & David Swaim, Jr., Act Doesn’t Live up to Its Name, TEXAS 
LAWYER, Jan. 18, 1999, at 26). 
55. Id. at 1687-88. 
56. See id. at 1686. 
57. Trucios-Haynes, supra note 40, at 1009. 
9
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E.  American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 
2000
58
 
 
The American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 
2000 (AC21CA) took off where ACWIA left off with regards to the 
demand for increased availability of skilled workers. As a result, the H-
1B annual cap was increased to 195,000 for the fiscal years 2001 to 
2003.
59
 To optimize the visa allocation, visas issued by fraud or 
misrepresentation were to be recaptured and restored to the cap,
60
 and 
further, individual visa holders were to be counted only once against the 
cap within the six year period, unless they were eligible for a new six 
year period if they had been out of the country for one year.
61
 AC21CA 
completely exempted from the annual cap those H-1B visas issued to 
employees of higher education institutions, related nonprofit entities, and 
nonprofit or governmental research organizations.
62
 Further exemptions 
were afforded by the L-1 Visa and H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004, 
which “[e]xempted up to 20,000 visas per year from the . . . cap, persons 
who have earned a master’s or higher degree from a U.S. institution of 
higher education.”63 And the Twenty-First Century Department of Justice 
Appropriations Authorization Act allowed H-1B to extend beyond six 
years where a labor certification is pending one year or more.
64
 The H-
1B petitioning fee was further increased to $1,500 by the Omnibus 
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2005,
65
 which included the H-1B 
Visa Reform Act of 2004 to further fund the scholarship and training 
 
58. American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000, Pub. L. 
No. 106-313, 114 Stat. 1251 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.). 
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(1)(A)(iv)-(vi) (2008); see KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 12. 
60. Id. § 1184(g)(3). 
61. Id. § 1184(g)(7). 
62. Id. § 1184(g)(5). 
63. KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 19; see also Consolidated Appropriations Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 425(a), 118 Stat. 2809, 3356 (2004) (codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(5) (2008)). 
64. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b) (2008)); see 
KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 16. 
65. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 §1184(c)(9)). Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 422(b)(2), 118 Stat. 2809, 3353 
(2004) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(9)(B) (2008)). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/4
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programs established under IMMACT90.
66
 
Concerned with issues of backlogs, AC21CA allowed EB-1, EB-2, 
and EB-3 beneficiaries who were unable to obtain a visa due to per-
country limitations to obtain H-1B extensions beyond six years until their 
adjustment of status application was adjudicated.
67
 Further, unused 
employment-based visas were used for persons from oversubscribed 
countries (e.g., India and China).
68
 A more significant improvement 
made by AC21CA was to allow EB-1, EB-2, and EB-3 beneficiaries 
whose adjustment of status applications had been pending 180 days or 
more to change employers without affecting their applications, if the new 
job was in the same or a similar occupational classification as the job for 
which the petition was filed.
69
 
 
F. Employ American Workers Act
70
 
 
In response to the 2008 financial crisis and the pressure from 
various interest groups, the Employ American Workers Act (EAWA) 
was enacted to prohibit the hiring of H-1B by any company accepting 
TARP funds unless such hiring complied with the stricter attestation 
requirements as imposed on an H-1B dependent employer. That 
provision was in effect until February 17, 2011.
71
 
 
III. From the Floor of the Congress to Reality: The Numbers Game 
 
The quantitative limitations imposed on the H-1B visas and 
employment-based preference categories have been controversial and 
have contributed to the oversubscription and the backlog issues. This 
Part will trace how the quantitative protectionist measures enacted by the 
various amendments have interacted with the dynamism of the economy 
 
66. See Cromwell, supra note 3, at 462; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
REPORT ON H-1B PETITIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2005 (2006), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/H1B05Annual_08_7.pdf. 
67. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c) (2008). 
68. Id. § 1152(a)(5)(A); see KURZBAN, supra note 11. 
69. Id. § 1154(j); see KURZBAN, supra note 11. 
70. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L No. 111-5, § 1611, 
123 Stat. 115, 305 (2009) (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (2006)). 
71. See KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 28. “It exempts [the Immigration and 
Nationality Act] § 212(n)(1)(E)(ii).” Id. 
11
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and competition to contribute to two main problems that have serious 
repercussions for the competitiveness of the immigration system. 
 
A. The Oversubscription Issue 
 
As Table 1 shows, the overall total annual H-1B visas issued for the 
last ten years have ranged from 355,000 to 460,000.
72
 This includes those 
H-1B hires who were subject to the 65,000 annual cap, the 20,000 visas 
designated since 2005 for those with a master’s degree or higher from a 
U.S. institution, as well those who were H-1B hires by higher education 
institutions, related nonprofit entities, and nonprofit or governmental 
research organizations (not subject to any caps). Looking at Table 1 for 
the years 2000 to 2007, the total number of H-1B visas issued annually 
was escalating, with a slight dip in 2002 and 2003 to indicate the lagging 
effect of the dot.com bubble burst on hiring policies in information 
technology companies.
73
 A similar slowdown is indicated in 2008 and 
2009 due to the recent financial crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2009 
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 63-65 (2010), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2009/ois_yb_2009.pdf [hereinafter 
2009 YEARBOOK]. 
73. Id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/4
SAMINATHAN_Formatted_Finalv8 4/11/2012  7:34 PM 
2012] COMPETITIVENESS VERSUS PROTECTIONISM 161 
 Table 1
74
 
 
Temporary Workers in Specialty Occupation 
(H1-B) (2000-2004) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total* 355,605 384,191 370,490 360,498 386,821 
Non-
Exempt 
115,000 195,000 195,000 65,000 65,000 
Exempt 240,605 221,191 305,490 295,498 321,821 
Percent 
Exempt 
67.7% 57.5% 82.5% 82% 83.2% 
Temporary Workers in Specialty Occupation 
(H1-B) Continued (2005-2009) 
Year 2005 2006** 2007** 2008** 2009** 
Total* 407,418 431,853 461,730 409,619 339,243 
Non-
Exempt 
65,000 85,000 85,000 85,000 85,000 
Exempt 342,418 346,853 376,730 324,619 254,243 
Percent 
Exempt 
79.1% 80.3% 81.6% 79% 75% 
 
* Includes those H-1B workers who work for 
exempted organizations and thus do not come within the 
cap. 
**Visa cap for those years is 85,000—includes the 
20,000 H-1B visas allotted to foreign nationals who are 
graduates with a master’s degree or higher from a U.S. 
university.
75
 
 
Within the number of overall total H-1B visas issued annually, there 
 
74. Id. See Table 2, infra note 80; Table 3, infra note 84. 
75. See Paschal O. Nwokocha, American Employment-Based Immigration Program 
in a Competitive Global Marketplace: Need for Reform, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 38, 
45-47, 49 (2008). 
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SAMINATHAN_Formatted_Finalv8 4/11/2012  7:34 PM 
162 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32:1 
is a pattern for those H-1B visas issued that are subject to the annual cap. 
The sum total effect of ACWIA and AC21CA is reflected in Table 2.
76
 In 
1999 and 2000, the cap was increased to 115,000 and all visas were 
issued.
77
 However, in 2001, the cap was increased to 195,000, but only 
163,600 were issued.
78
 In 2002, the cap was at 195,000 but only 79,100 
were issued, and in 2003, with a cap of 195,000, only 78,000 visas were 
issued, due in part to the dot.com crisis.
79
 
 
Table 2
80
 
 
H1-B Visa Caps and Issues 
Fiscal Year Visa Cap Visas Issued 
1999 115,000 115,000 
2000 115,000 115,000 
2001 195,000 163,000 
2002 195,000 79,100 
2003 195,000 78,000 
 
In the subsequent years, when the annual cap reverted to the pre-
ACWIA and AC21CA level, the scramble for H-1B visas within the 
exempted category comprising 85,000 visas in total can be seen by the 
oversubscription as well as the cutoff subscription date that gets earlier 
and earlier. For the 2006 fiscal year, it was August 10, 2005.
81
 For the 
2007 fiscal year, it was May 26, 2006.
82
 Finally, for the 2009 fiscal year , 
163,000 petitions were submitted by April 10, 2008 (see Table 3).
83
 
 
 
 
 
76. NAT’L FOUND. FOR AM. POLICY, H-1B VISAS BY THE NUMBERS: 2010 AND 
BEYOND 5 (2010), available at http://www.nfap.com/pdf/1003h1b.pdf [hereinafter VISAS 
BY THE NUMBERS]. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Nwokocha, supra note 75, at 47. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
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Table 3
84
 
 
H1-B Visa Cap and Cutoff Dates 
Fiscal 
Year 
Visa Cap Date Cap 
Reached 
Applications 
Received 
2005 65,000 10/1/2004** 65,000 
2006 85,000* 8/10/2005** 85,000 
2007 85,000* 5/26/2006** 85,000 
2008 85,000* 4/3/2007 150,000 
2009 85,000* 4/10/2008 163,000 
 
* Includes the 20,000 H-1B visas allotted to foreign 
nationals who are graduates with a master’s degree or 
higher from a U.S. university.
85
 
** Cutoff dates when H-1B stopped receiving due 
to cap being reached.
86
 
 
Interestingly, the H-1B visas issued yearly from the exempted 
category kept within a range of 79-83 percent of the total amount issued, 
except that in 2000 and 2001 the figure was much lower due to the 
increase in the issuances of H-1B visas that were subject to the increase 
in the annual cap. In 2009, the number dipped to 75 percent due to the 
global financial crisis (see Table 1), demonstrating the effect of free 
market forces on immigrant supply and demand. On the other hand, the 
H-1B visas that were subject to the cap had been oversubscribed since 
2005, indicating the strong unmet demand by the economy (see Table 3). 
 
B. The Backlog Issue 
 
Two conditions contribute to the backlog issue: the huge volume of 
H-1B visa holders applying for legal permanent residence under the EB-
2 and EB-3 categories, and the 7 percent country origin limitation 
imposed by the INA. 
Given the large number of H-1B issuances over the years (see Table 
 
84. Id. 
85. See id. at 46. 
86. Id. at 47. 
15
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1), it was estimated that in 2006 there were over 1,000,000 H-1B visa 
holders (including their dependents) who had applied for legal permanent 
residence—most of them through EB-2 and EB-3 categories.87 It is likely 
that this number may have doubled by now.
88
 Such a huge volume of 
applications needs time to be processed, given that the maximum cap for 
all five employment-based categories is 140,000 and EB-2 and EB-3 are 
only allocated 40,040 immigrant visas each.
89
 The visa allocation process 
is further impacted by the restrictions imposed by section 202(a) of the 
INA, which requires that “[t]he total number of immigrant visas made 
available to natives of a single foreign state . . . may not exceed 7 percent 
. . . of the total number of such visas made available under such 
subsections in that fiscal year.”90 As a result, immigrants from a 
particular country of origin under EB-2 and EB-3 are technically limited 
to 3,920 legal permanent resident visas. Any unused visas from the other 
three preference categories will then be utilized under EB-2 and EB-3, as 
the maximum annual number of immigrant visas issued per country 
cannot exceed 9,800 visas,
91
 despite the fact that the AC21CA now 
allows unused visas to be utilized to meet the demands of oversubscribed 
countries, increasing the national origin quota ceiling further.
92
 
The limited amount of immigrant visas and the country of origin 
constraints have a serious effect on the waiting period for legal 
 
87. See Steve Lohr, The Real High-Tech Immigrant Problem: They’re Leaving, 
N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Mar. 2, 2009, 12:01 AM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/02/the-real-high-tech-immigrant-problem-theyre-
leaving; see also Wadhwa, supra note 8. 
88. See EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARD, supra note 7. For the last ten years, 
even if half of the H-1B holders had applied for legal permanent residence under the EB-
2 and EB-3 categories, there would have been, approximately 1,954,000 principal 
applications, which when taken together with their dependents, would equal around 
2,150,000 applicants. Id. 
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (d)(1)(A) provides that maximum number of visas available for 
the five employment-based categories is 140,000. 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (d)(1)(A) (2009). Visa 
allocation should not exceed 28.6 percent (40,040) of that maximum number for EB-1, 
EB-2 and EB-3 respectively, 8 U.S.C § 1153(b) (2006), and should not exceed 7.1 
percent (9,940) for EB-1 and EB-2 respectively, 8 U.S.C § 1153(b)(4) (2006). 
90. EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARD, supra note 7, at 2 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 
1152(a)(2) (2000)). 
91. See Malshe, supra note 3, at 388. 
92. See EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARD, supra note 7, at 2; see also KURZBAN, 
supra note 11, at 12. Although the effect of AC21CA is to ease the national origin quota 
per country requirement, the total employment-based green cards issued must still be 
within the overall 140,000 worldwide limits. EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARD, supra 
note 7, at 2. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/4
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permanent residence adjudication, especially for nationals from the top 
six countries of origin.
93
 Table 4 shows H-1B visas holders from the top 
six countries: India, Canada, the U.K., Mexico, China and Japan. 
 
Table 4 
 
H-1B Visas Issued & Top Six Countries of Origin 
 India Canada UK Mexico China Japan Total H-
1B Visas 
Issued
94
 
2007
95
 157,613 26,209 25,507 18,165 16,628 14,435 461,730 
2008
96
 154,726 23,312 19,209 16,382 13,828 11,788 409,619 
2009
97
 123,002 22,156 14,610 14,352 12,922 9,677 339,243 
 
The implication of the above mix is that nationals who are 
beneficiaries of EB-2 and EB-3 have to wait longer and longer for their 
country’s priority date.98 Table 5 shows the priority dates for EB-2 and 
EB-3 petitions from China, India and Mexico. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93. The effect on Mexicans and Canadians is not considered in this analysis, as no 
analysis on those nationals would be complete without consideration of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA is beyond the scope of this Article. 
94. 2009 YEARBOOK , supra note 72, at 65. 
95. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2007 
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 84-87 (2008), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2007/ois_2007_yearbook.pdf 
[hereinafter 2007 YEARBOOK]. 
96. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008 
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 84-87 (2009), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2008/ois_yb_2008.pdf [hereinafter 
2008 YEARBOOK]. 
97. 2009 YEARBOOK , supra note 72, at 84-87. 
98. See LAWLER, supra note 34. Priority date is the date the Department of Labor 
accepts the Labor Certification Application and the immigration process cannot be 
completed without the priority being current. Id. 
17
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Table 5
99
 
 
Category Description Priority 
Date 
China India Philippines 
EB-2 Advanced 
Degree 
Current May 8, 
2006 
May 8, 
2006 
Current 
EB-3 Skilled 
Worker 
December 
15, 2004 
October 
22, 2003 
January 1, 
2002 
December 
15, 2004 
EB-3 Other 
Workers 
March 22, 
2003 
March 22, 
2003 
January 1, 
2002 
March 22, 
2003 
 
The net effect is that petitioners from India and China, for instance, 
may have to wait for their EB-3 legal permanent residence as long as 
twenty years, and for twelve years or more under EB-2.
100
 Individuals 
from other countries may have to wait six to seven years under EB-3, and 
three to five years under EB-2.
101
 
Table 6 below shows the annual legal permanent residency 
admissions issued for adjustment of status under EB-2 and EB-3 during 
the last ten years.
102
 As can be seen from Table 6, the admissions in 
respect to adjustment of status under EB-2 for the last ten years range 
from 12,900 to 68,800 and for EB-3 the range is from 26,962 to 
109,700.
103
 These wide ranges shows the difficulty in keeping track of 
these figures and reconciling them with the annual cap—an indication of 
the administrative complexity involved in managing the admission of 
immigrants in accordance with the provisions of immigration laws. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
99. Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of St., Bureau of Visa Bulletin for 
September 2010, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV (Aug. 9, 2010), 
http://travel.state.gov/visa/bulletin/bulletin_5113.html. The bulletin summarizes the 
availability numbers during September 2010. Id. 
100. EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARD, supra note 7, at 1. 
101. See id. at 6. 
102. 2009 YEARBOOK, supra note 72, at 18-19. 
103. Id. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/4
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Table 6
104
 
 
EB-2 & EB-3—Legal Permanent Residence Admissions (2000-
2004) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
EB-2-New 
Arrival 
1,857 6,533 5,323 2,437 1,400 
EB-2-AOS 18,398 36,017 38,993 12,969 31,134 
Total 20,255 42,550 44,316 15,406 32,534 
EB-3-New 
Arrival 
12,578 20,566 23,448 19,453 20,094 
EB-3-AOS 37,011 65,281 64,554 26,962 65,875 
Total 49,589 85,847 88,002 46,415 85,969 
EB-2 & EB-3—Legal Permanent Residence Admissions 
Continued (2005-2009) 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
EB-2-New 
Arrival 
1,488 
 
972 1,171 1,214 1,216 
EB-2-
AOS 
41,109 20,939 42,991 68,832 44,336 
Total 42,597 21,911 44,162 70,046 45,552 
EB-3-New 
Arrival 
19,357 29,531 22,388 9,922 6,873 
EB-3-
AOS 
109,713 60,390 62,642 38,981 33,525 
Total 129,070 89,922 85,030 48,903 40,398 
 
IV. The Effectiveness of the Dichotomy Objectives in Keeping the 
Balance at the Four Levels 
 
This Part considers the effectiveness of the dichotomous objectives 
on four levels: global labor market, domestic industry’s need, U.S. 
workers, and international workers. 
 
 
104. Id. Any unused visas for a category can be used in other employment-based 
preference categories, and unused visas in one fiscal year can be used in future fiscal 
years—should demand exceed the cap in that fiscal year. Nwokocha, supra note 75, at 
44. 
19
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A. Global Labor Market 
 
1. Importance of Immigration 
 
Immigration increases productivity and gross domestic income 
without reducing native employment rate in the long run.
105
 Findings 
have further indicated that immigration has the effect of creating jobs.
106
 
A survey found that over 25 percent of the technology companies 
founded in the U.S. from 1995 to 2005 were headed by legal permanent 
residence or naturalized citizens who initially came to study or work in 
the U.S.
107
 Those companies generated more than “$52 billion in revenue 
and employed 450,000 workers” in 2005.108 
 
2. The Competition: Point Based System vs. Preference System 
 
Due to the recognition that immigrants have made significant 
economic contribution to their new countries,
109
 there exist other 
attractive immigration destinations, apart from the U.S., such as Canada, 
Australia,
110
 and New Zealand.
111
 These four countries
112
 were the 
traditional receiving countries. Since 2000, several European Union 
member states, including Germany, the U.K., France, Ireland, and 
Sweden, reformed their immigration laws to join the competition to 
attract the best and brightest.
113
 While there is cross-immigration among 
 
105. See GIOVANNI PERI, MIGRATION POLICY INST., THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS IN 
RECESSION AND ECONOMIC EXPANSION 4 (2010), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Peri-June2010.pdf. 
106. See NAT’L FOUND. FOR AM. POLICY, H-1B VISAS AND JOB CREATION 1 (2008), 
available at http://www.nfap.com/pdf/080311h1b.pdf [hereinafter VISAS AND JOB 
CREATION]. 
107. Wadhwa, supra note 8. 
108. Id. 
109. See Shachar, supra note 1, at 152. 
110. Id. at 151. 
111. See id. at 179-84 (New Zealand’s innovative “talent visa” system eliminates 
the traditional long bureaucratic process the immigrant faces in securing employment 
authorization.). 
112. Id. at 159. 
113. See id. at 151. 
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these countries, India and China still maintain their status as the “two 
main sending countries.”114 
The common thread that exists among nearly all of these 
immigration destination countries is that their immigration laws focus on 
a “selective admission procedure” that is based on points and which 
aggressively markets towards and recruits the best and brightest.
115
 A 
typical point-based system awards points or scores cumulatively on 
several bases including: education, job experience, language proficiency, 
age range, and arranged employment, in addition to other variations.
116
 
Once a potential immigrant achieves the points stipulated by the relevant 
agency, legal permanent residency is granted immediately upon arrival to 
the host country—not only to the principal applicants but also to their 
dependents.
117
 The flexibility of the point-based system hinges on the 
bases for awarding points, which, along with their corresponding point 
values, can be changed. Likewise, the least amount of points needed to 
qualify for legal permanent residency may be adjusted to reflect the 
needs of the labor market or the types of professionals the country 
seeks.
118
 
On the other hand the dichotomous tension that pervades the U.S. 
preference system seems to impede the U.S. from competing on the same 
footing as the countries that have adopted a point-based system.
119
 In the 
U.S., the best and brightest have to wait years for their legal permanent 
residency.
120
 It is troubling that, in 2006, 26 percent of the patent 
applications filed in the U.S. were owned or co-owned by foreign 
nationals, and more than 40 percent of international patents filed by the 
U.S. government had foreign authorship.
121
 This explicitly means that 
these foreign nationals are likely in the U.S. on temporary work permits, 
such as H-1B visas,
122
 with no certainty that they will be able to stay 
 
114. Id. at 168 n.73 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
115. See id. at 151-52, 171-96. 
116. Id. at 171-72. 
117. Id. at 174 n.91, 175. 
118. Id. at 174. 
119. See id. at 196-99 (the highly skilled potential immigrant finds receiving 
countries that grant permanent residency immediately upon the immigrant’s entry more 
attractive, whereas the U.S.’ system is laden with burdensome bureaucracy and long 
waits, leading to insecurity for both the worker and his employer). 
120. EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARD, supra note 7, at 1. 
121. Wadhwa, supra note 8. 
122. Id. 
21
SAMINATHAN_Formatted_Finalv8 4/11/2012  7:34 PM 
170 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32:1 
given the long wait required to become a legal permanent resident.
123
 
These patent-owning foreign nationals, along with their patent 
ownership, would likely be received with open arms and granted 
immediate residency by any of the competing countries. 
 
3. Changing Economic Landscape 
 
There seems to be a shift in the identities of sending countries such 
as India and China, due to their burgeoning economic power.
124
 As a 
result, a number of their nationals repatriated from countries such as the 
U.S. in recent years, and repatriation numbers are likely to increase.
125
 In 
Asia, countries such as Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea have joined 
the repatriation club, where policymakers have spent extensively to 
welcome back their overseas nationals.
126
 This “reverse brain drain”127 
may have been further exacerbated by the deepening global recession,
128
 
because receiving countries are cutting back on immigration due to its 
perceived adverse effect on their domestic employment.
129
 
 
4. Future of Immigration on the Global Level 
 
In the long run, however, when the world economy recovers, 
receiving countries, including the U.S., will scramble to fill in the 
lacunae engendered by the reverse brain drain trend. Further, the looming 
threat of an aging world population, and its corollary—a declining and 
 
123. See EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARD, supra note 7, at 1. 
124. See Wadhwa, supra note 8. 
125. Id. Because of the small number of visas available to foreign students studying 
in the U.S., there is less than a 50 percent chance such a student will secure permanent 
residency. Id. 
126. Shachar, supra note 1, at 159-60, 167. 
127. Villiers, supra note 35, at 1882. This occurs where “[h]ighly skilled 
professionals, . . . who entered [a wealthier] country legally to study or work, . . . return[] 
to their countries of origin in unprecedented numbers and driv[e] research and 
development there.” Id. 
128. See PERI, supra note 105, at 13; see also Vivek Wadhwa, Is the U.S. 
Experiencing its First Brain Drain?, NEW AM. MEDIA (Mar. 31, 2009), available at 
http://www.soc.duke.edu/GlobalEngineering/pdfs/media/losingtheworlds/nam_usexperie
ncing.pdf. 
129. See PERI, supra note 105, at 6-7 (analysis finds that immigration reduces 
native employment, but only in the short-run, over four or five years). 
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aging workforce,
130
 would undoubtedly lead to very aggressive 
marketing for, and recruitment of, the best and brightest at the global 
level. Given the relative lack of competitiveness of its preference system, 
the U.S. will likely lag behind in recruiting the best and brightest if the 
problems associated with its dichotomous objectives remain unresolved. 
 
B. Needs of the Domestic Industries 
 
1. Sentiments of the U.S Domestic Industry 
 
Microsoft’s Chairman Bill Gates and Google’s Vice President for 
People Operation Laszlo Bock echo the sentiments of the information 
technology industry that, in order to maintain its status as the worldwide 
leader in technology, the U.S. technology industry needs highly skilled 
and talented foreign students and professionals to meet the demand 
created by the shortage of skilled native workers.
131
 Further, both leaders 
maintain that, if the U.S. does not reform its immigration system to 
attract and retain the best and brightest, it would lose out to its other 
global competitors who have designed their immigration systems just for 
such purposes.
132
 
 
2. Response by the U.S Domestic Industries 
 
As a consequence of the U.S. immigration system’s inability to 
meet the requirements of domestic industries in respect to attracting and 
retaining the best and brightest and meeting the demand for skilled labor, 
domestic companies, especially those in the information technology and 
pharmaceutical industries, have responded by relocating their 
 
130. U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIV., WORLD POPULATION 
AGEING: 1950-2050, at 29, U.N. DOC. ST/ESA/SER.A/207, U.N. SALES NO. E.02.XIII.3 
(2002), available 
athttp://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/worldageing19502050/ [Hereinafter 
WORLD POPULATION AGEING]. By 2050, older persons, those over sixty years old, are 
expected to constitute 21 percent of the world’s population, whereas in 2010 this group 
made up only 10 percent. Id. at xxviii. 
131. Malshe, supra note 3, at 374-75; see VISAS AND JOB CREATION, supra note 
106, at 2-3 (referencing the testimony of Laszlo Bock before the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International 
Law, on June 6, 2007). 
132. Malshe, supra note 3, at 375. 
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organizations to countries with friendlier immigration policies,
133
 or to 
traditional sending countries, such as India and China.
134
 
In 2007, Microsoft established the Microsoft Canada Development 
Center, in Vancouver, British Columbia, to enable it to “recruit and 
retain highly skilled people affected by the immigration issues in the 
[U.S.].”135 In addition, U.S. companies, such as Cisco Systems and IBM, 
have gone further by locating their global base in Bangalore, India.
 136
 
Meanwhile, 34 percent of the research and development staff at General 
Electric’s Jack Welch Technology Center in Bangalore are returnees 
from the U.S., as are more than 50 percent of those with Ph.D.’s at the 
IBM research center in the same city.
137
 Further, Indian companies are 
discovering new drugs and designing components for jetliners for their 
U.S. and European clients who have outsourced their projects.
138
 In 
China, hundreds of billions of dollars are being invested jointly by 
multinational companies and the Chinese government to make it an 
“export power in semiconductors, passenger cars, and specialty 
chemicals.”139 Further, the Chinese government is subsidizing research 
laboratories in biochemistry, nanotechnology, computing, and aerospace, 
where dozens of their top scientist are returnees from the U.S.
140
 
Because protectionist measures have eroded the competitive edge of 
the U.S. immigration system, these companies have further fueled the 
reverse brain drain. Ironically, the very tool employed to protect the U.S. 
workers against job loss or displacement is acting as a backlash; the job 
creation and investment opportunities are lost in light of such relocation 
and outsourcing. 
 
C. U.S. Workers 
 
Trade unions and other workers interest groups have pushed for 
 
133. Cromwell, supra note 3, at 473. 
134. Wadhwa, supra note 8. 
135. Cromwell, supra note 3, at 476 (alteration in original) (quoting Todd Bishop, 
Microsoft Plans to Open Software Center in B.C., SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 6, 
2007, at 1) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
136. Wadhwa, supra note 8. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
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protectionist measures at every recent attempt to infuse competitiveness 
into U.S. immigration law.
141
 The mechanisms utilized to safeguard the 
interests of the U.S. workers essentially hinge on annual numerical 
limitations on the issuance of H-1B, EB-2 and EB-3 visas, and the 
requirement that employers test the labor market conditions.
142
 
The labor market test requirements seek to prevent wage 
suppression, adversely affected working conditions, and the 
displacement of qualified U.S. workers.
143
 Those requirements are 
achieved by paying the H-1B hire the prevailing wage or actual wage, 
whichever is higher, as well as ensuring that the benefits offered are the 
same as those offered to a U.S. worker.
144
 For EB-2 and EB-3 petitions, 
the employer, in addition, has to advertise the job and carry out a 
recruitment process to ensure there is no U.S. worker qualified to 
perform that job; otherwise the qualified and willing U.S. worker should 
be hired instead.
145
 
The critical issues in this analysis are whether these protectionist 
measures adequately protect the U.S. workers, and whether the price paid 
for such measures is justified. 
 
1. Labor shortage 
 
One of the rationales for hiring H-1B workers is to meet the labor 
shortage.
146
 In response to the information technology industry’s pre-
ACWIA lobbying effort, in support of which the industry maintained the 
necessity of an increase in the H-1B program’s annual cap to meet labor 
demand, critics noted that, despite high numbers of job vacancies in that 
field,
147
 thousands of employees were laid off.
148
 The underlying reason 
 
141. See Cromwell, supra note 3, at 465; see also Christopher Fulmer, Comment, A 
Critical Look at H-1B Visa Program and Its Effects on U.S. and Foreign Workers—A 
Controversial Program Unhinged from Its Original Intent, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
823, 828-29, 843-49 (2009). 
142. Cromwell, supra note 3, at 459-60. 
143. Id. at 471. 
144. Fulmer, supra note 141, at 830-31. 
145. Malshe, supra note 3, at 366. 
146. Cromwell, supra note 3, at 465-66. 
147. Trucios-Haynes, supra note 40, at 1006. 
148. Id. at 1013. In 1999, for instance Electronic Data Systems laid off 5,180 
workers, Compaq laid off 2,150 workers, id. at 1013 n.194, and the average 
unemployment rate for IT workers over forty years is more than five times that of other 
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given for the layoffs, however, was that those workers lacked the 
necessary skill to contribute to the growth of the industry.
149
 Further, it 
was unreasonable to require employers to train under-qualified workers, 
when there are qualified foreign workers available to perform the job 
immediately,
150
 despite the extra administrative and financial burdens 
imposed on these employers.
151
 Policymakers seemed to accept this 
viewpoint and, to counteract against long-term labor shortage, they have 
imposed higher petitioning fees, which go towards the establishing 
scholarships and training funds for information technology students and 
workers.
152
 
 
2. Are They Really the Best and Brightest? Or Is It a Question of 
Cheap Labor? 
 
The other rationale for hiring and retaining the best and brightest 
foreign workers is that they would contribute significantly to the 
country’s human capital and knowledge base.153 
Nevertheless, critics claim that 56 percent of the H-1B workers 
were rated at Level I—“beginning level employees who have only a 
basic understanding of the occupation [and who] perform routine tasks 
that require limited, if any, exercise of judgment,”154 31 percent were 
rated at Level II—”qualified employees who have attained, either 
through education or experience, a good understanding of the 
 
unemployed workers. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ACT, S. REP. NO. 106-260, at 28 (2000). According to a report 
released by the National Research Council in 2000, older workers do face obstacles in the 
IT industry even in boom time. Cromwell, supra note 3, at 468. 
149. See Cromwell, supra note 3, at 466. 
150. Id. at 466. 
151. See id. at 459 (extra administrative and financial burdens include the LCA and 
the petitioning fees). 
152. See id. at 461, 464, 469. 
153. See id. at 473. 
154. Norman Matloff, Fixing Our Badly Broken H-1B Visa and Employer-
Sponsored Green Card Programs 7 (Sept. 19, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (alteration 
in original) (quoting EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PREVAILING 
WAGE DETERMINATION POLICY GUIDANCE 7 (2005), available at 
http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pdf/Policy_Nonag_Progs.pdf) (internal quotation 
marks omitted), available at 
http://www.cwalocal4250.org/outsourcing/binarydata/PrevWage.pdf; see also Fulmer, 
supra note 141, at 851. 
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occupation,”155 only 8 percent were classified at Level III—”experienced 
employees who have with sound understanding . . . and have attained . . . 
special skills or knowledge,”156 and just 5 percent were classified at 
Level IV.
157
 Critics argue that IMMACT90 requires “highly specialized 
knowledge” as the standard for qualifying for H-1B visas, yet only 13 
percent of the H-1B hires actually qualified under that standard.
158
 
Consequently, these critics conclude that either the majority of the H-1B 
hires are “ordinary people doing ordinary work,” or the employers under-
represented the qualifications of these hires in order to pay a lower 
prevailing wage.
159
 
Although it is unlikely that employers misrepresent their H-1B 
employees’ qualifications,160 it is likely that they hire foreign workers 
who are overqualified relative to the job description.
161
 Since, according 
to the Department of Labor guidelines, the prevailing wage is tied to the 
qualifications and experience attributable to the job descriptions and not 
to the worker’s actual qualification and experience, it would seem that, 
although the employer is in compliance with the prevailing wage 
requirement, it may hire a foreign worker at a wage rate that is not 
commensurate with the worker’s actual, higher qualifications and 
experience—hence, the cheap labor argument.162 
The H-1B (or EB-2/EB-3 beneficiary) hire performing in 
accordance with the job description renders moot the cheap labor 
argument, and therefore no potential for wage suppression exists. 
However, in this situation, the issue concerns hiring overqualified 
workers, which is not disallowed by the current labor condition 
application.
163
 Upon further examination, overqualified workers are 
 
155. Fulmer, supra note 141, at 851-52 (quoting EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., supra 
note 153) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
156. Id. (quoting EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., supra note 154) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
157. JOHN MIANO, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, LOW SALARIES FOR LOW 
SKILLS: WAGES AND SKILL LEVELS FOR H-1B COMPUTER WORKERS 7 (2007), available at 
http://www.cis.org/articles/2007/back407.pdf; id. at 852; Matloff, supra note 154. 
158. Fulmer, supra note 141, at 852 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1) (2008)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
159. Matloff, supra note 154. 
160. See id. 
161. See id. at 851. 
162. See id. 
163. There are no findings, empirical or anecdotal, to indicate H-1B workers, or 
beneficiaries of EB-2 or EB-3 have been hired to work in jobs other than what they have 
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likely to perform at a higher level, and hence, enhance productivity. This 
added value is not factored into the wages, thus benefitting the employer. 
Viewed from this perspective, employers get more out of foreign 
workers than they are willing to pay. Thus, the added value the employer 
acquires more than offsets the additional administrative and financial 
burdens associated with hiring a foreign national. This practice would 
likely have some adverse effect, in the long run, on the wages paid for 
such jobs, since the scope of the position would have been enlarged but 
the wage would remain unchanged. 
From the perspective of a U.S. worker with the minimum 
qualifications required by the job, she would be competing with an 
overqualified foreign national who thus would likely be the better 
candidate. The labor condition application process for H-1B petition only 
ensures against wage suppression and adverse working conditions.
164
 
Displacement becomes an issue only during the labor certification 
process for EB-2/EB-3 petitions, which requires that the employer 
advertise the position and attempt to hire a willing and able U.S. 
worker.
165
 Even then, it seems that employers tend to favor their 
international workers who have already proven their abilities by making 
significant contributions at less cost.
166
 
 
3. The Economic Crisis 
 
Prompted by massive job losses, particularly in the financial 
industry, due to the recent economic crisis, the Grassley-Sanders 
Amendment, a protectionist measure, bars (except under certain 
circumstances) H-1B hires by banks and other financial institutions that 
received a stimulus package under the TARP, until February 17, 2011.
167
 
Despite criticism that the amendment would hinder the economic 
 
been hired to perform as per their job description. See generally Wadhwa, supra note 8. 
164. Only a thirty days’ notice must be posted in the job board of the employer 
informing that an H-1B candidate is being hired for the job in question. Fulmer, supra 
note 141, at 831. 
165. See Malshe, supra note 3, at 366. 
166. See id. at 386; see also Wadhwa, supra note 8 (“. . . I know from my 
experience as a tech CEO that H-1Bs are cheaper than domestic hires. Technically, these 
workers are supposed to be paid a ‘prevailing wage’ but this mechanism is riddled with 
loopholes . . . so you can hire a superstar for the costs of an average worker.”). 
167. KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 28, 748; see also Malshe, supra note 3, at 379-80. 
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revival,
168
 the timeliness and the restraint, shown in terms of short term 
restriction, reflect the recognition that, in the short run, economic 
downturns do have an impact on employment,
169
 and the U.S. workers do 
need to be protected, even if the number of H-1B hires in the industry as 
compared to the overall U.S. workforce is negligible.
170
 
 
4. Adequate Protection at a Justified Price? 
 
Conceptually, the tools employed by the labor condition application 
requirement for both the H-1B hires and beneficiaries of EB-2/EB-3 
should adequately protect the U.S. workers against wage suppressions, 
adverse working conditions, and displacements, and such protectionist 
measures are needed. There is room, however, for manipulations and 
circumventions, such as hiring overqualified international workers at the 
expense of U.S. workers. 
The protectionist measure taken in terms of quantitative restriction 
is very controversial.
171
 The tension between the dichotomous objectives 
becomes apparent. On one hand, there is a concern that increase or 
removal of the numerical restriction would increase the influx of foreign 
workers, who would then displace the U.S. workers from their jobs.
172
 
On the other hand, the domestic industry, particularly the information 
technology industry, needs the numerical limitations to be increased in 
order to meet its demands for workers with particular skills sets who 
happen to be foreign nationals.
173
 Those demands were met during the 
period from 1999 to 2003, when the H-1B cap was increased—a 
temporary measure.
174
 After 2003, the cap reverted to the pre-1999 level, 
and no change was ever made to the quota restrictions relating to the 
employment-based preference categories since IMMACT90’s inception 
 
168. Malshe, supra note 3, at 380 (citing Economic Focus: Give Me Your Scientists, 
ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 2004, at 84). 
169. See PERI, supra note 105, at 4. 
170. NAT’L FOUND. FOR AM. POLICY, H-1B VISAS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
(2009), available at http://www.nfap.com/pdf/090205policybrief.pdf [hereinafter VISAS 
AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS]. 
171. See Trucios-Haynes, supra note 40, at 1008-10; Hahm, supra note 23, at 1697-
1700. 
172. Cromwell, supra note 3, at 457. 
173. Hahm, supra note 23, at 1693. 
174. Id. at 1675-76. 
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in 1990.
175
 As a result, employers have started to relocate or outsource, 
thus depriving the U.S economy of potential job creation and income 
opportunities.
176
 
At this point in time, it appears that the price paid for protectionism 
is not justified. On one hand, the U.S workers are not adequately 
protected and, on the other hand, they lose out in terms of loss of job 
creation opportunity, when this very protectionist measures forces the 
employers to relocate or outsource. 
 
D. International Workers 
 
1. Protection for the International Workers 
 
While the primary purpose of the LCA is to safeguard the U.S 
workers against wage suppression and adverse working conditions, a 
corollary purpose of that requirement is to ensure that the international 
worker on an H-1B visa is also protected from wage exploitation and 
“the imposition of inadequate working conditions.”177 The ACWIA 
further requires H-1B workers to be eligible for the same benefits offered 
to a U.S. worker employed in a similar position.
178
 The rationale for this 
level of protection is that, by leveling the field between the U.S. worker 
and international worker, an employer would now be required to offer 
similar compensation package and working conditions to the 
international workers. At the same time this also alleviates the incentive 
to hire an international worker over an U.S. worker since the cost of 
hiring an international would only be outweighed by the additional 
administrative burden and costs of obtaining the work permit visas.
179
 
Nevertheless, when employers manipulate or circumvent the system, 
such as hiring overqualified international workers, the playing field gets 
tilted against the U.S. workers. The additional value an overqualified 
international worker would offer to the employer in terms of enhanced 
productivity may outweigh the administrative cost of such a hire over a 
 
175. KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 6; Cromwell, supra note 3, at 456-57. 
176. See Cromwell, supra note 3, at 477-78. 
177. FRAGOMAN ET AL., supra note 12, § 2:1. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
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U.S. worker who may have the required qualification to do the job.
180
 
This has two adverse consequences: exploitation of wages for 
international workers and, more importantly, potential for wage 
suppression in the long run, thus eroding the protection afforded to the 
U.S workers. Therefore, it follows, that any shortcomings in terms of 
protection afforded to the international workers would also adversely 
affect the U.S. workers. 
 
2. Restrictions Imposed on the International Workers and Its 
Consequences 
 
On the other hand, the restrictions, particularly on quantitative 
limitations and portability, imposed on H-1B employment have 
significant repercussions. Since most of the H-1B hires do want to stay in 
the U.S., they are likely to have an EB-2/EB-3 petition pending, and 
because of the current backlog, most of them have to wait for a decade or 
more for their legal permanent residency application to be adjudicated.
181
 
During the pendency of the petition, with restricted portability, the 
international worker’s career, personal development, and advancement 
are impeded.
182
 Further, the uncertainty associated with final adjudication 
of their legal permanent residency after the long wait has also prevented 
these international workers from laying deep roots in this country.
183
 
 
3. Anecdotal Findings 
 
Anecdotal findings also suggest that, even before the recession, 
international workers, even those who already have their legal permanent 
residence, were returning to their home countries; this was so with 
Indians and Chinese.
184
 The recession, of course, had exacerbated the 
 
180. See KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 28, 748; see also Malshe, supra note 3, at 379-
80. 
181. See EMPLOYMENT-BASED GREEN CARD, supra note 7, at 1; Wadhwa, supra 
note 8. 
182. KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 1007-08; Fulmer, supra note 141, at 855. 
Although allowed to change employers, employment must be within the same or similar 
job classification. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j) (2009). 
183. Wadhwa, supra note 8. 
184. See VIVEK WADHWA ET AL., AMERICA’S LOSS IS THE WORLD’S GAIN (2009), 
available at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedfiles/americas_loss.pdf. 
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situation.
185
 The reason given for the reverse exodus seems to be pursuit 
of professional advancement: 61 percent of Indians and 70 percent of 
Chinese returnees considered there to be better prospects in their home 
countries.
186
 Further, the findings revealed that 44 percent of the Indians 
who returned to India held senior management positions, while only 10 
percent of that same set of returnees had senior position in the U.S.
187
 
The figures for the Chinese were 36 percent and 9 percent 
respectively.
188
 Other motivating factors included wanting to be close to 
friends and relatives.
189
 Surprisingly, visa difficulties were not one of the 
dominant factors for returning.
190
 
As for students who form the pool for H-1B recruitment, it appears 
that only 58 percent of Indians, 54 percent of Chinese, and 40 percent of 
Europeans wanted to stay for a few years to gain work experience before 
heading home.
191
 Visa difficulties, however, were a dominant reason for 
this sentiment.
192
 Meanwhile, 74 percent of Chinese and 86 percent of 
Indians believed that they would thrive better in their home countries 
because of optimism about the economy in that country.
193
 
 
4. Aftermath of the Recession 
 
While those findings may be reflective of the recessionary times, 
and may even be welcoming given the high rate of unemployment, what 
will the scenario be once the world gets out of its economic slump? If the 
focal pursuits of these international workers, as suggested by the above 
findings, are advancement of career and being close to their family and 
friends, it is likely that any destination country offering benefits that 
encapsulate those desires will be able to attract and retain the next set of 
talent. 
 
185. See id; see also Wadhwa, supra note 128; Villiers, supra note 35, at 1890. 
186. Wadhwa, supra note 128. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. See id. 
191. Id.; see also WADHWA, ET AL., LOSING THE WORLD’S BEST AND BRIGHTEST 1-3, 
available at 
http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/ResearchAndPolicy/Losing_the_World's_Best_a
nd_Brightest.pdf. 
192.  See Wadhwa, supra note 128. 
193. Id. 
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V. The Final Analysis: The Impact of the Dichotomy—A Case for 
Reform? If So, What Reform? 
 
A.  Ideal System 
 
Ideally, when the dichotomous objectives are in balance, U.S 
workers should be adequately protected against displacement, wage 
suppression, and adverse working conditions. Domestic industries should 
also have access to international workers, in order to overcome labor 
shortage, to be able to harness the special talents or abilities of 
international workers in tandem with its U.S. workers, and to develop 
business. The U.S., as a global competitor, should be able to attract the 
talent needed to support its domestic industries’ needs, and international 
workers should be able to identify the U.S. as the country that will meet 
their career and personal advancement goals. 
 
B. Current Status-Consequences of the Shortcomings of the System 
 
Currently, the system is out of sync at all the four levels discussed 
above. The decade or more wait for legal permanent residence is 
impeding the U.S. from attracting the best and brightest talents. At the 
same time, the U.S.’s global competitors are in the position to offer 
immediate permanent residency.
194
 The burgeoning new economies, such 
as in India and China, may impact the flow of immigrants. Already there 
is evidence of reverse brain drain from the U.S. to these countries, 
although that flow at present may have been exacerbated by the 
deepening worldwide recession. Further compounding these changes is 
the looming threat of the world’s aging population.195 All these 
developments may heighten the competition for the best and brightest. 
On the domestic level, dissatisfaction with the competitiveness of 
the immigration system, which has resulted in employer’s inability to 
hire the necessary skilled workers, has caused some of the leading 
information technology companies to relocate or outsource their work.
196
 
 
194. See id. 
195. See, e.g., WORLD POPULATION AGEING, supra note 130. 
196. VISAS AND JOB CREATION, supra note 106, at 2; Malshe, supra note 3, at 376; 
Cromwell, supra note 3, at 475-77. 
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This, in turn, has serious repercussion to the U.S. economy; much needed 
job creation opportunities are lost at the time when they are most 
needed.
197
 
The very mechanism utilized to protect the U.S workers against 
wage suppression and adverse working conditions may have the potential 
to be misused and may adversely affect the interest of the U.S. worker. 
The hiring of overqualified international workers may be in compliance 
with the law, but it still does have the potential to suppress wages in the 
long run.
198
 
Any immigration destination countries or home countries that can 
offer career and personal advancement to international workers, as well 
as an opportunity to be with their family, will likely be attractive.
199
 
 
C.  What Kind of Corrective Measures 
 
Given the imbalance, it is apparent that corrective measures are 
needed. Various reforms have been suggested by commentators
200
 and 
this Article focuses on taking corrective measures within the immigration 
system to bring about the balance of the dichotomous objectives. 
Whether these corrective measures would succeed would depend on how 
well these measures will be able to synchronize the various needs at the 
four levels: global competition, domestic industry, U.S. workers, and 
international workers.  
 
D.  Realignment: An Elegant Solution? 
 
The realignment corrective measures should focus on two levels: 
tightening the protectionist measures by leveling the playing field 
between the U.S. workers and international workers, and improving 
competitiveness by adjusting or modifying the quantitative limitations. 
 
 
197. See VISAS AND JOB CREATION, supra note 106, at 12. 
198. Wadhwa, supra note 8; see Trucios-Haynes, supra note 40, at 977, 986-88; 
Fulmer, supra note 141, at 858. But see VISAS BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 76, at 13-14; 
Malshe, supra note 3, at 369-70. 
199. Shachar, supra note 1, at 158-59; Wadhwa, supra note 128. 
200. See, e.g., Malshe, supra note 3, at 381-90; Shachar, supra note 1; Cromwell, 
supra note 3, at 478-80; Hahm, supra note 23, at 1691-700. 
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1. Leveling the Playing Field 
 
The current practice of hiring overqualified international workers is 
made possible because of the requirement that the prevailing wage be 
tied to the job description.
201
 The net result of such practice favors the 
hiring of an international worker over a U.S. worker, despite the 
additional administrative and financial burdens associated with such a 
hire, because of the extra value added an international worker contributes 
to the employer.
202
 
Requiring that the prevailing wages be tied to the qualification of 
the international worker instead of the job description seems to be an 
untenable solution, as this would mean that an overqualified person can 
never take a low paying job.
203
 
One proposal, which may be viewed as a compromise solution to 
this issue, has been made in the H-1B and L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2009 
(S. 887) proposed by Senators Durbin, Grassley, and Sanders.
204
 The 
proposal requires employers to pay the highest of the prevailing wage, 
the median average wage, or the “median wage for skill level 2 . . . found 
in the recent Occupational Employment Statistics [OES] survey.”205 By 
requiring OES level 2 wages, this proposal prevents employers from 
hiring overqualified international workers at level 1 and paying wages at 
that level.
206
 However, there has been suggestion by critics that requiring 
median average wage or median OES wage for level 2 constitutes 
“disguised restriction on trade” and hence could be in violation of the 
U.S.’s commitment to the General Agreement on Trade and Services 
(GATS).
207
 It is further claimed that since the thrust of the proposal in S. 
 
201. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n) (2010); MIANO, supra note 157, at 2-3; Cromwell, 
supra note 3, at 458-59. 
202. Wadhwa, supra note 8; Matloff, supra note 154, at 9-10. 
203. See Cromwell, supra note 3, at 458. 
204. H-1B and L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2009, S. 887, 111th Cong. § 101(a) (2009). 
205. Id. § 205(a). 
206. See Matloff, supra note 154, at 23. More than 50 percent of the H-1B workers 
are hired for jobs as classified as level one. Id. at 7. 
207. JOCHUM SHORE & TROSSEVIN, PC, NAT’L FOUND. FOR AM. POLICY, LEGAL 
ANALYSIS: PROPOSED CHANGES TO SKILLED WORKER VISA LAWS LIKELY TO VIOLATE 
MAJOR U.S. TRADE COMMITMENTS 14-15 (2010), available at 
http://www.nfap.com/pdf/GATSLegalAnalysis_NFAPPolicyStudy_June2010.pdf 
(quoting General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. 14, Apr. 15, 1994 Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 33 I.L.M. 1167, 1177 
(1994) [hereinafter GATS]). 
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887 is to restrict H1-B hires—essentially a restriction on trade—the 
GATS exception in Art. 14(c) that allows for restrictions “necessary to 
secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent 
with the provisions of the Agreement including those relating to: (i) the 
prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices,” would not be 
applicable.
208
 However, hiring overqualified international workers is 
itself a restriction on trade, and, furthermore, it has an adverse effect on 
wages in the long run. Accordingly, because the proposal under S. 887 
curbs such practices, it should come within the GATS exception.
209
 
The S. 887 proposal would have some leveling effect on the playing 
field between the U.S. worker and international worker: the U.S. worker 
is protected from displacement and the international worker gets paid 
wages commensurate with his qualification. Leveling the playing field is 
critical because once U.S. workers and international workers are on par 
with regard to employment and wages, market force can freely determine 
the type of skill sets and the number of international workers required by 
the domestic market, as there is no longer a question of displacement 
because of cheap labor. 
 
2. Quantitative Limitations & Competitiveness 
 
Numerous suggestions have been made regarding the 
oversubscription issue with H-1B visas and the corresponding backlog 
issue with EB-2/EB-3 petitions. Suggestions range from complete 
removal of the cap
210
 to complicated staggered categorized exemptions 
or increased caps.
211
 
The complete removal of a cap seems an elegant solution.
212
 By 
ensuring a level playing field, an employer would only hire an 
 
208. Id. at 15 (quoting GATS art. 14). The argument is that the restrictive measure 
itself must be in compliance with the preamble in Article 14, which requires any measure 
“not to be applied in a manner that would constitute [a] . . . disguised restriction on trade 
in services,” for the Article 14(c) exception of GATS to be applicable. Id. at 14-15. 
209. See id. 
210. Seth R. Leech & Emma Greenwood, Keeping America Competitive: A 
Proposal To Eliminate The Employment-Based Immigrant Visa Quota, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. 
REV. 322 (2010). 
211. See Malshe, supra note 3, at 388-89; see also Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006); Mitchell Wexler, Policy Goal of 
Immigration Reform—Our Nation’s Best Interest, 13 NEXUS 45, 46 (2008). 
212. See Leech & Greenwood, supra note 210, at 356-57. 
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international worker if there were truly a shortage of labor with the 
necessary talent or skill sets, which would enhance the employer’s 
business and which is in line with the rationale of the immigration 
policies.
213
 Market forces would determine the rest, including how many 
H-1Bs are to be hired.
214
 Employers would get to decide how many of 
these international workers are to be sponsored for immediate legal 
permanent residency at any point in their employment (because they 
would have become valuable human capital to the organization and 
ultimately to the country).
215
 U.S. economic conditions would induce the 
corrective adjustments that determine whether these legal permanent 
residents stay or leave.This solution further meets the needs of the four 
levels: global competitiveness, domestic competitiveness, protection of 
U.S. workers, and protection of international workers. 
However, whether this solution is palatable to politicians is another 
issue to be considered. For example, Senator Simpson stated: “Since the 
United States cannot accept all those who would wish to come, the 
following very real questions then come to us: How many immigrants 
should be admitted?”216 This statement, which was made during the 
hearing before the subcommittee in 1981, seems to reflect the sentiment 
of many politicians today. As a compromise, the Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform Act of 2006 (S. 2611), sponsored by Senators Arlen 
Specter and others, proposes an increase in the H-1B cap to 115,000 with 
a built in market-based calculation under which the cap is to be increased 
by a further 20 percent if the cap was reached in the previous fiscal 
year.
217
 Other proposals to overcome the oversubscription issue include 
excluding internationals with advance degrees in science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics from that limitation.
218
 In respect to 
backlog issues, S. 2611 recommends that the annual worldwide cap for 
employment-based immigrants be increased to 450,000 for a period of 
ten years, and subsequently level off at 290,000, with spouse and 
children beneficiaries exempted from that cap.
219
 The annual per country 
 
213. See id. at 355. 
214. Id. at 324. 
215. See id. at 355. 
216. The Preference System, supra note 31, at 19. 
217. See Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. 
(2006); Wexler, supra note 211, at 50-51. 
218. See, e.g., S. 2611. § 501; Wexler, supra note 211. 
219. S. 2611 § 501. Section 501 provides that spouses and children are to have their 
own limitation of 650,000 for the ten years. Id. Presumably they are to be included in the 
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limitation is to be increased to 10 percent.
220
 S. 2611 also further exempts 
completely from the cap: “Aliens who have earned advanced degrees in 
science, technology, engineering, or math and have been working in a 
related field in the U.S. under a nonimmigrant visa in the [three] year 
period preceding their application for an immigrant visa[,]”221 aliens 
“who have received a national interest waiver[,]”222 and “spouse[s] and 
minor children of . . . an employment-based immigrant.”223 
These recommendations certainly go towards resolving the issues 
resulting from the quantitative limitations imposed by the current 
immigration laws and make the immigration system more competitive. 
However, the question remains, is it competitive enough compared with 
the U.S’s competitors? Although the recommendations liberalize the 
quantitative limitations but what is interesting is the recommendation to 
exempt certain qualifications from such restrictions. This is the right 
direction. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
What reformative actions the U.S. government will take to remedy 
the shortcomings of the immigration system in respect to the admission 
of the best and brightest remains to be seen. What is certain is that some 
form of remedial or corrective measures need to be taken soon with 
regards to the current quantitative restrictions that have caused the 
system to be uncompetitive. The corrective measures recommended in 
this Article—leveling the playing field between U.S. workers and 
international workers as well as liberalizing the quantitative restraints—
would go a long way towards resolving the current shortcomings of the 
U.S. immigration system. The ongoing recession may have brought 
about some complacency, given that the other destination and 
repatriating countries have slowed down their race to attract the best and 
brightest. Such complacency may not last long. Once the world shakes 
itself out of the current economic slowdown, and with the looming threat 
 
290,000 cap after the ten years. The rationale is to resolve the backlog issue within the 
next ten years. Id. 
220. S. 2611 § 502. Presumably the national origin restriction is retained to 
maintain diversity. Id. 
221. S. 2611 § 508(a)(1). 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
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of the world aging population, the race for the best and brightest will 
intensify again. Given that immigrants’ contribute to fueling the 
economy by creating jobs, both the domestic industry and U.S. workers 
will benefit from such contributions. Thus, the U.S. needs to position 
itself as the leader once more in attracting and retaining the best and 
brightest, by taking those corrective measures before the recession is 
over. 
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